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This article contributes to the growing empirical literature on family firms by studying 
the impact of the founder–chief executive officer (CEO) succession in a sample of Italian 
firms. We contrast firms that continue to be managed within the family by the heirs to the 
founders with firms in which the management is passed on to outsiders. Family successions, 
that is, successions by the founder’s heirs, are further analyzed by assessing the impact of the 
sectoral intensity of competition on the post-succession performance. This analysis also 
addresses the endogeneity in the timing of the CEO succession by controlling for a pure 
mean-reversion effect in the firm’s performance. We find that the maintenance of 
management within the family has a negative impact on the firm’s performance, and this 
effect is largely borne by the good performers, especially in the more competitive sectors. 
These results indicate that there is no inherent superiority of the family-firm structure and 
emphasize the importance of conducting an analysis of governance in a variety of 
institutional settings. 
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 1. Introduction
1 
Research on family firms has blossomed in recent years (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). 
Much of the empirical analysis has been devoted to relatively large firms in the United States 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Pérez-González, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and has 
yielded mixed evidence on the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance. 
This literature, on the whole, has two major drawbacks: the ambiguity in the 
definition of a family firm and the weak applicability of the research results to other 
countries.  
On the definition, performance is sensitive to the way firms are classified. When the 
“lone-founder” effect is removed from the family category, evidence of superior 
performance of family-ownership disappears (Miller et al., 2007). The contribution of family 
characteristics that are typically indicated as being beneficial to the performance–such as 
stewardship, reduction in agency costs, long-term focus, and firm-specific investments 
(Davis et al., 1997; Maury, 2006; Miller and LeBreton Miller, 2005)–seems to vanish when 
a business is owned or managed by many family members. The inference is that a large part 
of the superior performance of a family business comes from the founder’s efforts. 
A similar argument applies to the literature on succession when the founder, as 
departing chief executive officer (CEO), is not distinguished from other, less involved 
family members and shareholders. The founder’s superior talent may be responsible for the 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Giuseppe Canullo, Maria Letizia Cingoli, Giuliano Conti, Guido De Blasio, 
Andrew Ellul, Michele Fratianni, Rick Harbaugh, Chang Hoon Ho, Isabelle Le Breton-Miller, Francesca Lotti, 
Pasqualino Montanaro, John W. Maxwell, Danny Miller, Harold Mulherin, Michael Rauh, Pramodita Sharma, 
and two anonymous referees of the “Journal of Corporate Finance” and the “Temi di Discussione” for helpful 
comments. Feedback and recommendations from seminar participants at Bank of Italy, Indiana University, 
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Fratianni and to the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University for their hospitality during the preparation 
of this paper. All mistakes and errors are the responsibility of the authors alone. The views expressed in this 
paper are ours alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
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decrease in post-succession performance, and the inefficient selection of the successors 
(Burkart et al., 2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003) or their scarce education (Pérez-González, 
2006) and management experience (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999) may further worsen the 
damaging effect of the change in leadership. Thus far, except for some anecdotic evidence 
that lacks direct extendibility, the literature on succession has basically ignored the very first 
succession in the firm, i.e. when the founder steps down, whereas it has largely studied later-
stage successions. 
With regard to the second drawback, the emphasis on the performance of relatively 
large public firms in the United States raises questions about the applicability of the results 
to economic settings other than the United States. A variety of institutional settings and the 
greater occurrence of small firms are bound to complicate the underlying model and 
therefore weaken the inference obtained from studies based on samples of primarily large 
firms. The conclusion is that it is risky to generalize from the extant literature (Miller et al., 
2007). 
With this premise, our article intends to study one aspect of family-run business, 
namely, the impact of the founders’ succession on firms’ performance. For this purpose, we 
use a large dataset drawn from Italian family firms in the manufacturing sector. Greater 
occurrence of small firms and frequent ownership and management transfer of family-owned 
business from one generation to another make the dataset drawn from Italian firms unique 
and different from the typical US dataset. These data may also provide more general insights 
for those countries where the firm’s ownership and management are typically inherited, and 
cultural values encourage the maintenance of firms within the family (Bennedsen et al., 
2007; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Using a transactional event (founder–CEO turnover), as suggested by Gillan (2006), 
we evaluate founder’s successions that occurred during the period 1996-2000 and compare  5
pre-succession performance with post-succession performance over a three-year window 
before and after the founder steps down. Within-firm variations in accounting measures of 
performance allow to control for time-invariant characteristics that might jointly affect a 
firm’s performance and its decision to appoint a family CEO, but which cannot be controlled 
for in a cross-sectional setting. We also include a number of controls that have been found to 
affect the CEO turnover decisions. In particular, by controlling for a pure mean-reversion 
effect in the firm’s performance (Adams et al., 2005), we address the endogeneity in the 
timing of the CEO succession, attributable to the founder’s desire to retire when the firm is 
in good shape. 
We first contrast firms that continue to be managed within the family by heirs to the 
founders with firms in which the management has passed on to outsiders. The decrease in 
the post-succession performance is larger for the heir-managed firms than for the companies 
managed by unrelated CEOs, due to the greater tendency of the unrelated managers to 
reorganize the poor-performing firms after succession. Because the promotion of unrelated 
CEOs usually occurs when there are no suitable family successors or when inadequate firm 
profitability forces the founder to sell the company, we restrict our more detailed analysis to 
family successions. 
The main finding of our study is that the inherited management within a family firm 
negatively affects the firm’s performance, even if this decrease in performance is 
concentrated among the good-performing companies, that is, founder-run companies which 
outperform sectoral average profitability before succession. The reduction in profitability is 
significant, although a part of the decreased performance is due to a pure mean-reversion 
effect, and it is larger in more competitive sectors, where the talent of the founder is likely to 
be more valuable. In general, the loss of the founder has a negative impact on performance.   6
The findings of this study suggest that family firms are not necessarily more 
profitable than others, at least after the founder steps down, and therefore, they underscore 
the importance of conducting an analysis of the ownership and governance of firms in a 
variety of institutional settings. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 
presents the preliminary evidence of the impact of succession on the firm’s performance. 
Section 4 deals with family succession and tackles the endogeneity issue. Evidence for the 
effect of the sectoral competition intensity is also presented and discussed, together with 
further explanations of the post-succession profitability decline. Section 5 offers some 
conclusions. 
2. Data and preliminary empirical evidence 
2.1 Sample size and survey data 
The presence of small firms in Italy is pervasive: according to the Census data, 98% 
of Italian manufacturing companies in 2001 had fewer than 50 employees and accounted for 
more than 55% of the total manufacturing workforce. The percentages rise to 99% and 77% 
for firms and employment, respectively, for the class with fewer than 250 employees. A 
large portion of these companies is run as a family business, or has some key family 
shareholders able to exert a great influence on the company affairs (Fabbrini and Micucci, 
2004; Lotti and Santarelli, 2005). 
Nearly all the past studies on the succession process have focused on large, public 
companies listed in the official market. Listed companies usually have large records of data–
from the balance sheets and stock-market transactions–that enable measurement of the stock 
market’s response to the major changes in the firm ownership or management composition.  7
Company annual reports and the specialized press are also excellent sources of information 
for use in the analysis of the succession process.  
Data are, however, lacking for most firms in the small-business sector. Except for 
company accounts, publicly available data sources do not usually report the major factors 
affecting the succession, such as the firm’s start-up date, the year of the founder’s exit, or the 
characteristics of the management staff after the founder has stepped down. Most data can 
only be gathered by direct interviews. For this reason, a dataset has been constructed by 
matching two complementary sources: a cross-sectional survey dataset collected directly 
from the companies using questionnaire-based phone interviews, and a dataset from Cerved
  
consisting of company accounts.
2 The survey  has been restricted to a large set of nonfarm, 
nonservice companies in the manufacturing industry, located in four Italian regions (Veneto, 
Emilia Romagna, Marche, and Abruzzo) with some common features in the organization of 
their industry (the relevance of the ‘Made in Italy’ industries and the extensive presence of 
industrial districts). Important specializations in the industrial sector include fashion 
(clothing and footwear), wood and wooden furniture, mechanical industry, and plastic 
products. Because of this sample selection, the results are only representative of the reported 
firms. 
The initial sample size for the survey consisted of 7,500 companies satisfying these 
criteria with usable accounts for the period 1994-2004. A telephone survey of all these 
companies, conducted in the period March-July 2005, collected 3,548 answered 
questionnaires. The interview was conducted as follows. After asking for the company’s 
                                                 
2 Cerved is an authoritative and reliable source of information on Italian companies. Information is drawn from 
official data recorded at the Italian Registry of Companies and from financial statements filed at the Italian 
Chambers of Commerce. Cerved provides information on more than 600,000 joint stock, public and private 
limited share companies and limited liability Italian companies (Spa & Srl). Companies furnish data on a 
compulsory basis. The information provided includes credit reports, company profiles and summary financial 
statements (balance sheet, profit & loss accounts and ratios). Each company's financial statement is updated 
annually.  8
start-up year, and the details of the person currently managing the company, the questions 
took two different directions. If the founder was still managing the company, the questions 
asked were i) whether or not a few of the heirs were working in the company, ii) the 
founder’s age and iii) whether a succession was expected to occur in the next two years. If 
the founder was no longer managing the company, the questions asked were about i) the type 
of current management (heirs, an acquiring company, other external managers) and ii) the 
date when the succession took place.  
As the impact of the founder-CEO change on firm profitability was the main concern, 
the changes in the management, regardless of the status of company ownership and control, 
were focused on. Two main distinctive features of Italian family businesses support this 
assumption: an almost complete overlap exists between ownership and management, and 
management changes normally trigger subsequent changes in company control (from the 
founder to his heirs), rather than the reverse. 
Summary statistics for the complete sample, broken down by industry, size-class, and 
starting year, are set out in Table 1. The sample distribution of companies by their decade of 
birth shows that a large share (approximately 70%) of existing companies was born in the 
period between the early 1960s and the 1980s. Only a one-third fraction of these companies 
has already completed a succession process, whereas the remaining two-thirds is rapidly 
approaching a change of management.  
Founder-managed companies make up 64.6% of the total sample, with a share that 
constantly increases as the company start-up year approaches the present time period. The 
share of founder-managed companies also decreases with the firm size: 67.1% of companies 
in the 10-49 employee class are still founder-managed, whereas only 46.3% of these are in 
the 200+ class. The succession rate, defined as the ratio between the transferred (both heir-
run and unrelated-run) and total companies, increases with the size of the firm (larger firms  9
are likely to be older and thus to have already undergone a succession event), and it varies 
considerably among the various sectors. With respect to the choice between an internal 
(family) versus external (unrelated) succession, low and medium-low technology firms – 
grouped by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) four-
group classification based on their Research & Development (R&D) intensity: foods, 
clothing, footwear, wood, and furniture – are more likely to remain within the family, 
whereas other firms
 (mechanical industry, machinery, electronics, and domestic appliances) 
exhibit a higher incidence of unrelated succession. Similarly, larger companies are managed 
more frequently by unrelated successors than by heirs.  
2.2 Statistics on the firm’s performance 
Accounting data for the subsamples of heir-managed and unrelated-managed 
companies provides information on the company characteristics and its performance before 
and after the succession. Table 2 summarizes the company size at the moment of succession. 
Size is measured by the sales and total assets of the company. The total sample of 229 firms 
(177 heir-managed companies, where the new CEO is related to the founder by blood or 
marriage, and 52 unrelated-managed firms) comprises only those companies that 
experienced a succession in the time interval of 1996-2000 and for which financial data were 
available for the three-year window before and after the transition. Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics of profitability measured by the Returns on Assets (ROA) and Returns 
on Sales (ROS). Data are the simple averages of the three-year window before and after each 
transition. Extreme performance observations have been excluded by removing the largest 
and smallest 5% values for ROS and ROA; all the estimates reported in the remainder of the 
study are robust to the change of this outlier threshold. Profitability data are the simple 
averages for each group. Family successions are almost entirely transfers from the first to the  10
second generation, whereas only 14 transfers out of 177 are to the third generation or further. 
The group averages reported in Table 3 have been calculated after including all family 
successions (177).
3  
Post-succession performance shows a clear decline in the profitability for both 
indicators in the heir-managed and unrelated-managed companies: for the total sample, ROA 
reduces from 9.89 to 7.49, whereas ROS decreases from 7.61 to 5.90. The decline appears to 
be larger for the heir-managed companies than for the unrelated-managed ones, and it is 
statistically significant only for the former (for both profitability indicators).  
The group-adjusted profitability ratios in Table 3 provide further information on post-
succession company behaviour. The group-adjusted ROA and ROS of firm i were calculated 
by subtracting the group’s mean value from the three-year average performance of each 
company. The group mean value was calculated for the entire Cerved dataset by grouping 
companies within the same sector (three-digit SIC code), size-class (where the size-classes 
were 10- 49, 50-199, and 200+ employees), and area (region). Therefore, each of the two 
groups was compared against a control group with similar characteristics but which had not 
experienced a succession event.  
Heir-managed firms experience rather similar decreases in the post-succession 
performance for both ROA and ROS (-0.35 and -0.32, respectively; Table 3), which suggests 
a post-succession turnaround not significantly different from that observed in non-
transferred companies. By contrast, unrelated-managed firms exhibit a considerable post-
succession improvement in the adjusted ROA (from -1.48 to 0.35), whereas the effect on 
ROS appears to be smaller. In this case, even if the observed changes in profitability do not 
                                                 
3 The regression analysis reported in section 4 was based on the entire sample of family successions (177), 
without excluding the transfers to the third generation or further. The empirical results did not change if we 
restricted the analysis only to transfers from the first to the second generation.  11
appear statistically significant, the presence of a post-succession restructuring process in 
these companies can be presumed.  
3. Post-succession performance for the whole sample set 
For evaluating the impact of succession on the performance of the two groups of 
companies (heir-managed and unrelated-managed firms), we estimated the fixed-effect 
equation (1). Analysis of within-firm variation in the performance around a CEO transition 
provides a control for the time-invariant firm characteristics, observable or unobservable, 
that might influence the performance but cannot be controlled for in a cross-sectional setting. 
 
(1)               it it it controls Age Family After After ε α π α α α α π + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 * . 
 
 
A three-year window, before and after each transition, was considered in this study.
4 
The dependent variables, it π , were, respectively, ROA and ROS. The null hypothesis was 
that negligible changes in profitability would ensue from the succession; if, in contrast, the 
succession improved or deteriorated the firm’s performance, positive or negative changes 
should be observed, respectively, in the post-succession ROA and ROS. Independent 
variables included a dummy variable After, which was equal to one if the transfer of the 
management had already occurred, and it was equal to zero otherwise. The specification also 
included an interaction term After*Family, which captured the effect of succession within 
the family compared to that in unrelated succession. π  was the sector average profitability 
index calculated on the basis of the three-digit SIC, location, and size-class mean value. The 
variable  π  was introduced to examine the changes in the firm’s performance after 
                                                 
4 That is, if a succession occurred in the year 2000, the three-year window before succession was 1997, 1998, 
1999, and the three-year window after succession was 2001, 2002, 2003.  12
controlling for the effect of industry type, area, and size. Controls for the age of the firm and 
years effects were also added.  
The estimated results, as reported in Table 4 (column 1 for ROA and 4 for ROS), 
show that succession causes a reduction in the profitability, both in heir-managed and 
unrelated-managed companies, and they signal the existence of a succession cost in both the 
groups of firms.
5 However, though only a minor difference in the ROS between the heir-
managed and unrelated-managed companies is observed, the intensity of the impact is not 
the same when the profitability is measured by the ROA: in this case, the heir-managed 
firms clearly underperform with respect to the unrelated-managed companies. Distinct 
behaviours around the succession for the two groups of firms might be responsible for the 
differences observed: if poor-performing companies are more likely to be transferred outside 
the family than the good-performing ones, the new (unrelated) owners of the thus-acquired 
companies should be expected to restructure the company more extensively, thus improving 
the relative ROA. This preference to transfer a company outside the family when it has 
performed poorly (or when there is no suitable family successor) might affect the post-
succession comparison between the heir-managed and unrelated managed companies.
6   
Subsequently, equation (1) was reestimated by including only those companies that 
performed poorly before the succession to control for the above-mentioned potential bias. 
Poor performers were those firms with a profitability level below the median score of the 
distribution. The estimated results, reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 4, confirm the 
                                                 
5 In particular, for the 177 firms that experienced a family succession, we estimated a significant decline in both 
ROA (-1.96 p.p.) and ROS (-1.76 p.p) (see columns 3 and 6 of Table 4). 
6 In our sample, a lower adjusted pre-succession profitability is positively associated with the probability of the 
company’s transfer outside the family: firms passing to an unrelated manager have a pre-succession 
performance lower than that of heir-managed firms, in terms of both adjusted ROA (-0.73 p.p.) and adjusted 
ROS (-1.12 p.p.; Table 3). Giacomelli and Trento (2005) also found a similar tendency in a different sample of 
Italian manufacturing companies.  13
previous findings, i.e. a similar decrease in the ROS for the two groups but a larger decline 
in relative ROA in the heir-managed firms.  
Summing up, a clear evidence for a decrease in the profitability consequent to the 
succession from a founder to an heir has been confirmed, whereas the results are mixed 
when the heir and unrelated successions are compared. Furthermore, poor-performing 
companies passing to unrelated managers appear to undertake an intense post-succession 
reorganization of the company, whereas the heir-managed firms do not necessarily undergo 
reorganization.  
4. Family successions  
Very divergent firm-specific and country-specific features underlying the succession 
process might produce different strategic choices around the transition, which affect the 
post-succession performance in both family and unrelated successions. If unrelated 
involvement occurs when inadequate firm profitability forces the founder to sell the 
company, the comparison of post-succession performance between the two groups may 
become an extremely difficult issue to deal with. This may be even worse in situations where 
the social habits and inheritance norms strongly affect the CEO/successor choice in the 
transfer of business (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) and the family-run business is pervasive in 
the economy.  
Therefore, a more detailed analysis is restricted to the discussion of family 
successions.  
4.1 Does inherited management really hurt the family-firm performance? 
The first step was to analyze the extent to which the decrease in profitability after a 
family succession was related to the company’s pre-succession performance. The main 
expectation was a larger decrease in the good-performing companies if the talent tended to  14
regress to the population average (Becker and Tomes, 1986). The empirical equation was 
derived from equation (1) with a performance dummy added, as follows:  




Performers Good After After
ε α π α
α α α π
+ + + +
+ + =
4 3
2 1 0 _ *
 
 
where Good_Performers is a dummy variable indicating well performing companies. The 
dummy is equal to one if the firm-adjusted profitability is above the sample median score, 
and zero otherwise. The estimated results in Table 5 show that well performing companies 
are greatly harmed by the transfer of management to an heir: that is, the positive difference 
in the pre-succession performance, as shown in Table 3, strongly reduces after the family 
successors have been promoted to the CEO position. Although the coefficient of the term 
After is now not significantly different from zero, the entire decrease in performance is 
captured by the interaction variable After*Good_Performers, suggesting a very large decline 
in the profitability when the family successor takes over the family business. The estimated 
decrease falls within an interval of 4.70–4.00 percentage points for the ROA and ROS, 
respectively (Table 5), which is a very large reduction with respect to the pre-succession 
performance.
7  
A potential drawback to this approach concerns the issue of endogeneity: if the firm’s 
characteristics, like its recent performance, are expected to affect the decision on both 
whether and when to select a CEO from within the family, then the post-succession 
performance may reflect different features at the time of the firm’s transition (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001; Pérez-Gonzàlez, 2006).  
The suggestion that some of a firm’s characteristics (its current performance and 
future perspective) might affect the timing of the transfer and the type of CEO is not new in 
the literature on the transfer of assets and business. Focusing on the optimal timing of 
                                                 
7 Poor-performing companies show a weak and not statistically significant increase in post-succession 
performance.  15
succession, Kimhi (1994) and Miljkovic (1999) show that the optimal transfer time varies 
systematically with family and firm characteristics, as well as with other variables defining 
the critical level of the founder’s utility from the firm transfer to a succeeding child.   
Similarly, the hypothesis that an optimal selection of the CEO may emerge endogenously 
from the founder’s characteristics and the firm’s performance has recently received 
significant empirical support. Adams et al. (2005) show that a founder may deliberately 
choose to delay the transfer until the firm’s performance has reached a level high enough for 
the heir to have a better chance of improving its future operations. They explore this issue by 
assessing the extent to which the firm’s past performance, whether bad or good, helps in 
predicting a future change of command in which a founder steps down. They find evidence 
that a past good performance increases the likelihood that a founder will leave the firm in the 
near future, and that this result is consistent with two potential factors: 1) founder–CEOs 
may value control over their succession more than nonfounders, and 2) founder–CEOs may 
want to leave their companies ‘in good shape’. They conclude that this result has a direct 
implication for the evaluation of a firm’s performance after the founder’s exit: if 
performance is mean-reverting and the founders leave at its peak, performance is likely to 
decline after the succession even when the inherited control is not bad for performance.  
The significant decline in well performing companies that has been observed in these 
data might be not only due to the heir’s lower talent (managerial quality) with respect to the 
founder, but also due to ‘pure luck’ that pushes the performance towards the industry mean 
(Barber and Lyon, 1996). The pure effect of the mean-reverting trend of performance 
changes following succession had to be removed so as to isolate the management quality 
shift that is truly due to succession. As a control for this potential bias, a performance-based 
control group–matching method was applied as follows (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Huson et 
al., 2004): Each sample firm (run by heirs after a family succession) was matched to each  16
comparison firm (run by founders) in the Cerved database with the same three-digit SIC 
code, size-class, and location in the same region. The firm to be used as a comparative term 
was selected from among those firms whose performances in the year before the family 
succession were within ± 10 per cent of the sample firm’s performance. If there were no 
matched firms, the procedure was repeated using all the firms with the same three-digit SIC 
code and the same size-class, regardless of where they were located. Finally, the last step 
included all the firms with the same three-digit-SIC code, regardless of size-class and 
location area. The matching procedure enabled us to identify 561 founder-managed 
companies, which were used in the matched control group for 177 heir-controlled 
companies. The regression (3) includes both the 177 heir-controlled firms and the 561 
control firms
8. The empirical evidence set out in Tables 6.a, 6.b, and 7 arises from this 
matching method.
 9  
 
(3)              
it it
it
controls Age Performers Good Family After
Performers Good After Family After After
ε α π α α
α α α α π
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
6 5 4





The estimated results for equation (3), reported in Tables 6.a and 6.b for the ROA 
and ROS, respectively, suggest that even if a marked mean-reversion effect is detected, the 
evidence for a substantial decrease in the company’s performance following succession is 
significant. After controlling for the mean-reversion effect (captured by the interaction 
between variables After and Good_Performers), the estimates found a decline of more than 
1.5 points in the post-succession ROA and ROS for well performing companies (measured 
by the interaction term After* Family * Good_Performers) (column 4 in Tables 6.a and 6.b). 
Heir-managed companies achieved a post-succession performance significantly lower than 
                                                 
8 For each control firm , the variable After is set equal to 1 in the three-year window after the year of succession 
observed in the sample firm matched to that control firm, and 0 otherwise. 
9 We obtained a similar result also by using a one to one matching procedure that compared 177 heir-managed 
companies to 177 comparable founder-managed companies.   17
the founder-managed ones, thus confirming the difficulty encountered by good performers in 
finding a suitable successor within the restricted group of family members.  
4.2 Family successions and the sectoral level of competition 
If a company’s performance depends on the entrepreneur’s talent, profitability may 
be more heavily affected by succession in those industries where talent is more valuable, i.e. 
where the intensity of competition is substantial, as suggested by recent contributions by 
Lazear (2002 and 2005). Thus, the next step in the analysis concerns the effect of the sectoral 
competition intensity on the company’s performance after succession. The empirical 
equation that was used to test the impact of succession was similar to the equation (3), with 
the addition of a dummy relative to some industry characteristics as follows:  
 




stics characteri Industry Performers Good Family After
Performers Good Family After
Performers Good After Family After After
ε α π α
α
α
α α α α π
+ + + +
+ +
+ +




3 2 1 0





where the interaction variable Industry_characteristics referred to three different criteria (the 
firm-size distribution, the technology, and the intensity of competition in the industry in 
which the firm competes) for which specific variables were selected as follows: The ‘Small 
size’ variable reported in Table 7 was a dummy variable equal to one if the firm size 
(number of employees) was below the sample median score. Small firms should be more 
common in traditional industries with low entry barriers and little need for managerial and 
financial resources. For this reason, the negative post-succession effect was expected to be 
lower in those companies than in large firms. However, in most small-sized and medium-
sized companies, replacement of the founder may also be extremely challenging because of 
his/her unique style of management and personal ties with stakeholders. As a consequence, 
the expected sign of the relationship was indeterminate. The ‘Medium-High tech sector’  18
variable was a dummy variable equal to one if the company belonged to the high and 
medium-high technology sectors, and zero if it was in the medium-low and low technology 
group. Sectors were grouped according to the OECD classification of three-digit SIC sectors 
based on their R&D intensity. The expected relationship with post-succession performance 
was negative: medium-technology and high-technology companies require entrepreneurs 
with substantial technical and managerial skills, and this may cause a large decrease in 
profitability if the management is inherited by an unsuitable successor. The ‘Strong 
competition sector’ variable was the three-digit SIC industry Lerner index of competition, 
which is (1-profits/sales), calculated as the average across the entire firm-level database for 
the period 1998-2002 (Aghion et al., 2005; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006). For the variable 
summarizing technological intensity, it was expected that the higher the competitive pressure 
in the industry, the larger the decrease in post-succession performance following the 
founder’s exit.  
The estimated results (Table 7) show that succession negatively affects the 
performance in sectors where the intensity of competition is high, that is, where the 
managerial quality of the successor is likely to play a key role in defining the company’s 
performance. If the competition is intense, successors are likely to need a longer time, or a 
better initial talent, than in other sectors for developing the ability required to manage the 
company successfully. Therefore, for a given distribution of the talent of successors, 
companies in the competitive sectors experience a larger decline in the post-succession 
profitability than do the firms working in the low competition industries.
10 
As a further robustness check, the variable After*Good_ performers* Strong 
competition sector was added in equation (4). This would enable the effect of family 
succession to be distinguished from that of variation in the levels of competition across 
                                                 
10 With regard to the size and technology dummies, the sign was negative for smaller firms and medium-high 
tech sectors, but without statistical significance.  19
various industry subsectors. The estimated coefficient of the variable After*Family 
succession*Good_performers* Strong competition sector remained negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the profitability decline observed was a consequence of the 
firm’s succession and did not arise from a widespread negative pattern of profitability 
affecting only the competitive sectors. 
4.3 Sales and profitability of the firm after family successions 
A final question concerns the potential role of factors other than the skills of the 
successors that might generate financial outflows and increase the firms’ operating costs 
after the succession, particularly, specific provisions such as pension plans in favour of the 
predecessor, ‘vendor take-back financing’, operating expenses due to the financing of the 
buyout. Even if the evidence for Italian family firms shows a very limited use of these 
techniques, it is necessary to exclude the possibility that the decrease in performance might 
depend on some costs generated by the succession. This issue is addressed by testing the 
impact of succession on the firm’s sales. If the succession significantly affects the sales, it 
could be reasonably concluded that the above-mentioned factors do not affect the 
profitability by increasing the succession costs, and that post-succession decline in 
profitability is mainly due to lower sales for given fixed costs.  
The impact of succession on sales was measured using two related variables: i) the 
annual growth rate of (deflated) sales and ii) the change in the sales turnover, i.e. the ratio 
between sales and total assets.  
The following equation à la Gibrat was estimated initially: 
(5) ∆log Si,t = α + ß1 log Si,t-1 + ß2 After + ß3 After*Family + Area dummies + Year dummies  
+ Sector dummies + µi,t , 
  20
where ∆log Si,t = log Si,t - log Si,t-1 is the annual growth rate in the sales of the firm “i”, and 
After*Family indicates the family successions. The estimated results are 
 
∆log Si,t = 0,140 - 0,020 log Si,t-1 + 0,002 After - 0,015 After*Family + Area dummies + Year 
dummies + Sector dummies + µi,t                                         (R
2 = 0,09) 
 
The negative coefficient of After*Family (statistically significant at 5%) shows that the 
transfer of the company produces a decline in the company sales in real terms. On adding the 
usual dummies for the good performers, a significant difference among the two groups was 
not obtained; i.e. both the groups experienced similar declines in their post-succession sales 
performances. Given the decline in the growth of sales after succession, the sales turnover of 
the groups was investigated subsequently: if this ratio did not increase significantly after 
succession to outweigh the negative pattern of sales, it could be argued that a substantial part 
of the post-succession decline in the profitability might have occurred because of a lower 
level of sales. Hence, differences in the sales turnover ratio between the heir-managed firms 
and the control sample, i.e. firms that did not undergo a succession, were investigated. The 
sales turnover ratio in the heir-managed firms decreased from 1.36 to 1.27, a decline that was 
not statistically larger than that of the control group. Again, significant differences emerged 
only for the good performers, with a decrease of 0.15 p.p. in the ratio, which was significant 
at 5% level. 
Summing up, family firms that undergo a succession achieve a lower growth of real 
sales compared to the control sample with no significant improvement in the sales turnover 
after succession. We therefore maintain that a hypothesis of a decrease in profitability caused 
by lower sales should not be rejected, and that expenses associated with residual payments to 
the founder might have played a minor role in explaining the post-succession decline in 
profitability in familial transferred companies.    21
A further warning concerns the long-term perspective of heir-managed companies: 
because family firms are strongly committed to long-term growth and stability, a larger 
investment expenditure around the succession in heir-managed firms cannot be excluded, 
which in turn would negatively affect the sales turnover. A regression analysis similar to 
equation (5) was carried out for the growth in total assets. The resultant findings show that 
the asset growth is slightly higher in the control sample, thus excluding more intense 
investment activity by the heir-managed firms.  
5. Concluding remarks 
A very large number of firms around the world is of small size, and these are run by 
families. Despite this evidence, so far the literature on family firms has focused on large, 
publicly traded companies, mainly because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on 
smaller firms. With the aim to shed light on this important sector of the economy, a unique 
dataset containing information on the family successions for a large sample of Italian firms 
was assembled. The significant presence of small-sized and medium-sized family-run 
businesses in the Italian manufacturing industry makes the country well suited for an 
empirical analysis of the impact of family successions. This study may provide more general 
insights for those countries where the firms’ ownership and management are typically 
inherited, and cultural values encourage the maintenance of firms inside the founder’s 
family.  
The main finding of this study is that inherited management within a family 
negatively affects the firms’ performance, and this decrease is concentrated among the good-
performing companies, that is, founder-run companies that outperform sectoral average 
profitability before the succession. The reduction in profitability is significant, although part 
of the decrease is due to a pure mean-reversion effect, and it is larger in more competitive  22
sectors, where the talent of the founder is likely to play a key role in defining the company’s 
performance. This evidence supports the recent results from Miller et al. (2007) showing that 
the superior performance of family firms might be primarily driven by the subsample of 
founder-run companies and suggests that there is no inherent superiority of the family-firm 
structure.  
We also find that the decrease in post-succession performance is larger for the heir-
managed firms than for the companies managed by unrelated CEOs because of a greater 
tendency for the unrelated managers to reorganize poor-performing firms after succession. 
This result indicates that a well functioning market for corporate control might provide a 
viable way out when the inheritance of a business may endanger the firms’ performance and 
survival. However, social norms may interfere with this mechanism because, as noted by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2006), family ties might make it difficult for a founder to dissociate 
the family from the business, despite the costs of preserving the family control in terms of 
the company’s performance. Therefore, it is hard to believe that, at least in the short run, the 
contestability of the firms’ management may substitute uncontested elections of family 
CEOs.  
Further research can investigate the impact of those factors that help the success of 
the family transition. In particular, the role of some managerial practices, such as the 
planning of succession, the criteria for selecting the successor inside the family members, the 
involvement of external consultants, or the adoption of appropriate financial tools, should be 
accurately analyzed as they might contribute significantly to the successful inheritance of 
business within the family.  
 Tables 
 
Table 1  
Description of the sample 
Firm’s CEO 










n. % n. % n.    % n. %  % 
        
Total  sample  2,292  64.6 834  23.5 422  11.9 3,548  35.4  23.5 
A .   S e c t o r s              
Foods  110  48.5 89  39.2 28  12.3 227  51.5  39.2 
Textile  &  Clothing  171  70.7 50  20.7 21  8.7  242  29.3  20.7 
Footwear  177  65.3 81  29.9 13  4.8  271  34.7  29.9 
Wood & Paper  184  63.0  76  26.0  32  11.0  292  37.0  26.0 
Chemical, Rubber, Plastic  171  58.8  79  27.1  41  14.1  291  41.2  27.1 
Minerals (no Metals)  135  55.8  70  28.9  37  15.3  242  44.2  28.9 
Metalworking  472 70.8  131 19.6  64  9.6  667 29.2  19.6 
Mechanical  Industry  394 64.5  124 20.3  93  15.2  611 35.5  20.3 
Machinery, Appliances, Vehicles  238  65.9  64  17.7  59  16.3  361  34.1  17.7 
Furniture, Toys, Jewels  240  69.8  70  20.3  34  9.9  344  30.2  20.3 
B.  Size-classes  (employees)           
10 – 49  1,759  67.1  596  22.7  267  10.2  2,622  32.9  22.7 
50  –  199  470 59.5  198 25.1  122 15.4  790 40.5  25.1 
200  +  63 46.3  40 29.4  33 24.3  136  53.7 29.4 
C.  Starting  year            
Before  1929  0  0.0  82 82.8  17 17.2  99 100.0  82.8 
1930-1939  1  2.4  31 73.8  10 23.8  42 97.6 73.8 
1940-1949  19 22.6  54 64.3  11 13.1  84 77.4 64.3 
1950-1959  66  33.2 112  56.3 21  10.6 199  66.8  56.3 
1960-1969  283 49.6  216 37.8  72  12.6  571 50.4  37.8 
1970-1979  645 67.5  188 19.7  122 12.8  955 32.5  19.7 
1980-1989  727 76.1  112 11.7  116 12.1  955 23.9  11.7 
1990-2005  450  84.3  35 6.6  49 9.2  534  15.7 6.6 
      
The table reports size, sector, and starting year characteristics for the sample. The sample includes 3,584 manufacturing companies within the 10-1,000 
employee range (in 2004) with usable accounts for the period 1994-2004. The sample of firms originated using the Survey by Marche Polytechnic 
University and Cerved database. Firms are located in four Italian regions with common features in the organization of industry (Veneto, Emilia Romagna, 
Marche, Abruzzo). The survey has been conducted in the period March-July 2005 by a group of four specially trained graduate interviewers. The telephone 
interview has been conducted as follows: After asking for the company’s start-up year, and the person who was currently managing the company, the 
questions took two different directions. If the founder was still managing the company, we asked if some heirs were working in the company, the founder’s 
age, and if a succession (in the management) was expected to occur in the next two years. If the founder was no longer managing the company, we asked 
about the type of current management (heirs, an acquiring company, other external managers) and the date when the succession (in the management) took 
place. As we were mainly concerned with the impact of CEO change on firm profitability, the sample is split according to the nature of the CEO who 
actually manages the company, regardless of the status of the company ownership and control. Founder, heir, and unrelated imply that the actual CEO of 
the firm is: the founder, an heir (related to the founder by blood or marriage), and a nonfamily manager, respectively. The succession rate is defined as the 
ratio between the transferred (both heir-run and unrelated-run) companies and total companies. Family successions include those management changes 




Sample statistics in the year of succession 
Variable 
Number of 
observations  Mean Median 
     
A.  SALES     
   Total sample  229  12,230  5,829 
   Unrelated  52  11,201  5,394 
   Heirs   177  12,533  5,953 
       good performers  88  13,076  7,539 
       poor performers  89  11,971  5,401 
B.  TOTAL  ASSETS     
   Total sample  229  9,483  4,159 
   Unrelated  52  8,441  3,506 
   Heirs   177  9,789  4,362 
      good performers  88  9,637  5,339 
      poor performers  89  9,947  3,810 
   
The table reports sales and total assets for the sample of 229 companies (177 heir-managed companies and 52 
unrelated-managed companies) that experienced a succession in the interval 1996-2000, and for which 
financial data were available for the three-year window before and after the transition. The sample of firms 
originated using the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. Mean (median) is the 
simple average for each group. Sales and Total Assets are expressed in thousands of Euros (revaluated; 
base=2005). Conversion rate: 1 Euro = 1.314 US dollar (February 2007). Both variables are calculated in the 
year of succession for each firm in the sample. Heir indicates a family succession where the new CEO is 
related to a departing family CEO or to the founder. Unrelated indicates the transfer of management to a 
nonfamily CEO. Good performers indicates good-performing companies, i.e. companies with group-adjusted 
profitability above the median score of the distribution. Poor performers are companies with adjusted 
profitability below the median score of the distribution. Group-adjusted profitability (ROA and ROS) of firm 
i has been calculated by subtracting the group mean value from the 3-year average performance of the single 
company. The group mean value has been calculated on the whole Cerved dataset by grouping companies 
with the same 3-digit SIC code (sector), size-class, and area. Group-adjusted profitability levels are reported 
in Panel B of Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Pre-succession  and post-succession firm profitability: ROA and ROS 
A-Absolute profitability levels 










succession  Difference 
       
I.  Total  sample    229  9.89 7.49 -2.40  **  7.61 5.90 -1.72  * 
   Unrelated   52  9.82  8.95  -0.87  7.26  5.88  -1.38 
   Heir   177  9.91  7.06  -2.84 **  7.72  5.90  -1.82 * 
Heir-Unrelated    0.08     -1.89 *  -1.97 *  0.46  0.02  -0.44 
        
II.  Heir    177        
   Good performers   88    13.72  8.78  -4.94 **    10.46  7.45  -3.01 ** 
   Poor performers   89  5.96  5.29  -0.68  4.88  4.30  -0.58 
   Diff.     7.75 **  3.49 **  -4.27 **  5.58 **  3.15 **  -2.43 ** 
           
B – Group-adjusted profitability levels 










succession  Difference 
       
I. Total sample   229  -0.91     -0.76  0.15     -0.08     -0.28     -0.21 
   Unrelated   52      -1.48  0.35  1.82     -0.95     -0.75  0.19 
   Heir   177      -0.74     -1.09     -0.35  0.17     -0.14     -0.32 
Heir-Unrelated     0.73     -1.43 *     -2.17 *  1.12 *  0.61     -0.52 
      
I.  Total  sample    177        
   Unrelated   88  3.85  1.17     -2.68 *  3.30  1.68     -1.62 * 
   Heir   89     -5.49     -3.43  2.06 *     -3.06     -2.03  1.04 ** 
Heir-Unrelated    9.34 **  4.60 **     -4.74 **  6.36 **  3.71 **      -2.65 ** 
       
This table reports the absolute and group-adjusted profitability levels for the total sample (229 companies) and for various subsamples 
(Unrelated, Heir, Good, and Poor performers). The sample of firms originated using the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and 
Cerved database. ROA (Return on Assets) and ROS (Return on Sales) are simple averages for each group. Pre-succession indicates the 
simple average profitability for the (-3,-1) window, where 0 is the year of succession. Post-succession indicates the simple average 
profitability for the (+1,+3) window (0 is the year of succession). Heir indicates a family succession where the new CEO is related to a 
departing family CEO or to the founder. Unrelated indicates the transfer of management to a nonfamily CEO. Good performers 
indicates good-performing companies, i.e. companies with group-adjusted profitability above the median score of the distribution. 
Poor performers are companies with adjusted profitability below the median score of the distribution. Group-adjusted ROA and ROS 
of firm i have been calculated by subtracting the group mean value from the 3-year average performance of the single company. The 
group mean value has been calculated on the whole Cerved dataset by grouping companies with the same 3-digit SIC code (sector), 






Inherited management and firm’s performance (ROA and ROS for family and unrelated successions) 
ROA ROS 












After -1.05  -0.52    -1.97**  -1.63*   
After * Family  -1.29*  -1.28*  -1.96*  0.06  0.07  -1.76** 
Mean ROA or ROS  0.84**  0.56**  0.64**  0.87**  0.54**  0.68** 
Age 11.35**  2.71*  5.49**  7.15**  2.80*  4.06** 
Year  effects  yes yes  yes  yes yes yes 
Firm  fixed-effects  yes yes  yes  yes yes yes 
Number  of  successions  229 115  177  229 115 177 
    of which: family successions  177  88  177  177  88  177 
Number of observations  1,374  690  1,062  1,374  690  1,062 
Adjusted  R-Square  0.14 0.08  0.14  0.14 0.06 0.13 
      
The table presents the results of firm fixed-effect regressions for the whole sample (229 companies), for poor performers, and for family 
successions. The sample of firms originated using the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. All successions 
in columns 1 and 3 include all (family and unrelated) successions (229). Poor performers in columns 2 and 4 indicate a regression 
restricted to the sample of poor-performing companies, i.e. companies with group-adjusted profitability below the median score of the 
distribution. Family successions in columns 3 and 6 indicate the regression restricted to the sample of successions within the family 
(177). The dependent variable is a profitability measure (ROA and ROS) that refers to a three-year window before (-3,-1) and after 
(+1,+3) each transition (year 0). Results for ROA are reported in columns 1-3, and for ROS in columns 4-6. Independent variables are 
(or are calculated as, in the case of interaction): After, a dummy variable equal to one for each of the three years after the change of 
management (in favour of both heirs and unrelated), and zero otherwise; Family, a dummy variable equal to one for firms in which 
family succession occurs; Mean ROA or ROS, computed at the level of 3-digit SIC code (sector), area, and size-class (using a three-
classes breakdown as: 10-49, 50-199, 200+ employees); Age, the natural logarithm of the firm’s age. Year and firm fixed-effects are 






Family succession and firm’s performance in good-performing companies 
Variable  ROA ROS 
After 0.39  0.12 
After * Good performers  -4.60**  -3.78** 
Mean ROA or ROS  0.72**  0.73** 
Age 4.73**  4.00** 
Year effects  yes  yes 
Firm fixed-effects  yes  yes 
Number of successions  177  177 
Number of observations  1,062  1,062 
Adjusted R-Square  0.20  0.19 
    
The table presents the results of firm fixed-effect  regressions for the sample of family successions. The sample of 
firms originated using the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. Family successions 
include those management changes (177) where the new CEO was related (by blood or marriage) to a departing 
CEO or to the founder. The dependent variable is a profitability measure (ROA and ROS) that refers to a three-
year window before (-3,-1) and after (+1,+3) each transition (year 0). Results for ROA are reported in column 1 
and for ROS in column 2. The independent variables are (or are calculated as, in the case of interaction): After, a 
dummy variable equal to one for each of the three years after the change of management, and zero otherwise; 
Good performers, a dummy variable equal to one for firms whose performance (relative to the mean at the level of 
3-digit SIC, area, and size-class) is above the median value of the sample; Mean ROA or ROS, computed at level of 
3-digit SIC (sector), area, and size-class (using a three classes breakdown as: 10-49, 50-199, 200+ employees); 
Age, the natural logarithm of firm’s age. Year and firm fixed-effects are included. ** = significant at 1% level. * = 








Family succession and firm’s performance using matched firms: ROA. 
ROA 
Variable 
Family Successions  Family Successions 
(only Good Performers) 
      
After 0.37  0.38  2.31**  2.05**  0.48 
After * Family  -1.00**  1.29**  -1.27**  -0.36  -2.09** 
After * Family * Good performers      -4.51**      -1.72**     
After * Good performers          -3.26**  -2.82**     
Mean ROA  0.43**  0.46**  0.51**  0.51**  0.60** 
Age 0.81  0.71  0.92  0.87  1.03 
Year  effects  yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
Firm  fixed-effects  yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
Control  firms  yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
      
Number of successions  177 
 
177   177   177    87   
Number of observations   1,062 
 
1,062   1,062   1,062    522   
Adjusted  R-Square  0.08   0.09   0.11   0.11    0.15   
                  
The table presents the results of matched firm fixed–effect regressions for the sample of family successions (177). The sample of firms originated using 
the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. Family successions include those management changes where the new CEO was 
related (by blood or marriage) to a departing CEO or to the founder. The dependent variable is a profitability measure (ROA) that refers to a three-year 
window before (-3,-1) and after (+1,+3) each transition (year 0). The independent variables are (or are calculated as, in the case of interactions): After, a 
dummy variable equal to one for each of the three years after the change of management, and zero otherwise; Family, a dummy variable equal to one for 
firms in which family succession occurs; Good performers, a dummy variable equal to one for firms whose performance (relative to the mean computed at 
the level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-class) is above the median value of the sample; Mean ROA, computed at level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-class 
(using a three classes breakdown as: 10-49, 50-199, 200+ employees); Age, the natural logarithm of firm’s age. Year and firm fixed-effect are included. 
Performance-based control group–matching method: each sample firm (run by heirs after a family succession) is matched to each comparison firm (run by 
founders) with the same 3-digit SIC code, size-class, and located in the same area. The firm to be used as a comparative term is selected from only those 
firms whose performances in the year before the family succession are within ± 10 per cent of the sample firm’s performance. If there are no matched 
firms, the procedure is repeated using all the firms with the same 3-digit SIC code and the same size-class, regardless of where they are located. Finally, a 
last step includes all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code, regardless of size-class and area. This procedure returned 561 control firms, for a total of 3,366 
observations (561 firms for 6 years). The regressions include both the 177 sample firms and the 561 control firms. ** = significant at 1% level. * = 




Family succession and firm’s performance using matched firms: ROS. 
ROS 
Variable 
Family Successions  Family Successions (only 
Good Performers) 
After -0.31  -0.33  1.03**  0.81*  -0.68 
After * Family   -0.77**  1.19**  -0.79**  0.02  -1.56** 
After * Family * Good Performers      -3.72**      -1.55**     
After * Good performers          -2.57**  -2.18**     
Mean ROS  0.44**  0.45**  0.48**  0.48**  0.65** 
Age 0.60  0.59  0.41  0.34  0.60 
Year  effects  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Firm  fixed-effects  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Control  firms  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
      
Number of successions  177 
 
177   177   177   87   
Number of observations   1,062 
 
1,062  1,062   1,062  522   
Adjusted  R-Square  0.06   0.08   0.10   0.10   0.15   
                  
The table presents the results of matched firm fixed-effect regressions for the sample of family successions (177). The sample of firms originated using 
the Survey by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. Family successions include those management changes where the new CEO was 
related (by blood or marriage) to a departing CEO or to the founder. The dependent variable is a profitability measure (ROS) that refers to a three-year 
window before (-3,-1) and after (+1,+3) each transition (year 0). The independent variables are (or are calculated as, in the case of interactions): After, a 
dummy variable equal to one for each of the three years after the change of control, and zero otherwise; Family, a dummy variable equal to one for 
firms in which family succession occurs; Good performers, a dummy variable equal to one for firms whose performance (relative to the mean computed 
at the level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-class) is above the median value of the sample; Mean ROS, computed at level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-
class (using a three classes breakdown as: 10-49, 50-199, 200+ employees); Age, the natural logarithm of firm age. Year and firm fixed-effect are 
included. Performance-based control group–matching method: each sample firm (run by heirs after a family succession) is matched to each comparison 
firm (run by founders) with the same 3-digit SIC code, size-class and located in the same area. The selection of the firm to be used as a comparative 
term is carried out by selecting only those firms whose performance in the year before the family succession are within ± 10 per cent of the sample 
firm’s performance. If there are no matched firms, the procedure is repeated using all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code and the same size-class, 
regardless of where they are located. Finally, a last step includes all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code, regardless of size-class and area. This 
procedure returned 561 control firms, for a total of 3,366 observations (561 firms for 6 years). The regressions include both the 177 sample firms and 
the 561 control firms. ** significant at 1% level. * significant at 10% level (based on T-statistics from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors) 
  
Table 7 
Family succession and firm’s performance by industry characteristics: ROA and ROS 
Variable  ROA ROS 
                  
After  2.05** 2.05** 2.00** 2.02** 0.81*  0.81*  0.80*  0.80* 
After  *  Family    0.09  0.08   -0.16   -0.20   0.23   0.18   -0.02   -0.02   
After  *  Family  *  Good  performers  -1.78** -1.78** -0.89    -0.97   -1.56** -1.55** -1.31*  -1.43* 
After  *  Good  performers  -2.82** -2.81** -2.81** -2.53** -2.18** -2.18** -2.18** -2.05** 
After * Family * Good performers *  -0.59            -0.28               
S m a l l   s i z e                    
After * Family * Good performers *       -0.80                -0.30           
Medium  –High  tech  sector                           
After * Family * Good performers *           -2.33**  -1.96**          -0.36    -0.26   
Strong  competition  sector                           
After * Good performers *               -0.61                -0.10   
Strong  competition  sector                   
Mean  ROA  or  ROS  0.51** 0.51** 0.51** 0.51** 0.48** 0.48** 0.48** 0.48** 
Age  0.91   0.86   0.92   0.80   0.45   0.43   0.45   0.41   
Year  effects  yes    yes   yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes  
Firm  fixed-effects  yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes  
Control  firms  yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes  
Number  of  successions  177   177   177   177   177   177   177   177   
Number  of  observations    1,062  1,062  1,062  1,062   1,062   1,062   1,062  1,062  
Adjusted  R-Square  0.11   0.11   0.11   0.12   0.10   0.10   0.10   0.10   
        
The table presents the results of matched firm fixed-effect regressions for the sample of family successions. The sample of firms originated using the Survey 
by Marche Polytechnic University and Cerved database. Family successions include those management changes (177) where the new CEO was related (by 
blood or marriage) to a departing CEO or to the founder. The dependent variable is a profitability measure (ROA and ROS) that refers to a three-year window 
before (-3,-1) and after (+1,+3) each transition (year 0). Results for ROA are reported in columns 1-4, and for ROS in columns 5-8. The independent variables 
are (or is calculated as, in case of interactions): After, a dummy variable that is equal to one for each of the three years after the change of control, and zero 
otherwise; Family succession, a dummy variable that is equal to one for firms in which family succession occurs; Good performers, a dummy variable that is 
equal to one for firms whose performance (relative to the mean computed at the level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-class) is above the median value of the 
sample; Mean ROA or ROS, computed at level of 3-digit SIC, area, and size-class (using a three classes breakdown as: 10-49, 50-199, 200+ employees); Age, 
the natural logarithm of firm’s age. Year and firm fixed-effect are included. The Small size variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the firm size (number of 
employees) is below the sample median value. The Medium–High tech sector variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the company belongs to high and 
medium-high technology sectors, and zero if it is in the medium-low or low technology group. Sectors are grouped according to the OECD four-groups 
classification of 3-digit SIC sectors according to their R&D intensity (high, medium high, medium low, low). The Strong competition sector variable is the 3-
digit SIC industry Lerner index of competition developed by Aghion et al. (2005). The index is calculated as the average across the entire firm-level database 
for the period 1998-2002. Performance-based control group–matching method: each sample firm (run by heirs after a family succession) is matched to each 
comparison firm (run by founders) with the same 3-digit SIC code, size-class, and located in the same area. The selection of the firm to be used as a 
comparative term is carried out by selecting only those firms whose performance in the year before the family succession are within ± 10 per cent of the 
sample firm’s performance. If there are no matched firms, the procedure is repeated using all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code and the same size-class, 
regardless of where they are located. Finally, a last step includes all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code, regardless of size-class and area. This procedure 
returned 561 control firms, for a total of 3,366 observations (561 firms for 6 years). The regressions include both the 177 sample firms and the 561 control 
firms. ** significant at 1% level. * significant at 10% level (based on T-statistics from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors). 
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